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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent/Plaintiff, 
VS. 
ADREN RAY WARNER, ] 
Appellant/Defendant. ] 
1 CASE NO. 890226CA 
PRIORITY NO. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
1. JURISDICTION: Jurisdiction in the Court of Appeals is 
conferred pursuant to U.C.A., section 78-2a-3(e). 
2. NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS; This is an appeal from the 
Defendant's conviction, pursuant to a hearing on a Motion to Suppress 
the Evidence and bench trial before the Honorable J.Dennis Frederick 
sitting in Summit County, Utah, for Possession of A Controlled 
Substance (Methamphetamine) on violation of U.C.A., section 
58-37-8(2) ( a ) { i ) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the Court Err by denying the Defendant's Motion to 
Suppress. 
2. Did the Court Err by ruling that the warrantless 
searches conducted by the UHP Trooper were constitutionally valid 
searches. 
3. Did the Court Err by allowing State's Exhibit No. 3 into 
evidence. 
4. Did the Court err by finding Appellant guilty based upon 
State's Exhibit No. 2 constituting an unusable and almost 
undetectable amount of a controlled substance. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged in a single count information with 
Possession of A Controlled Substance (Methamphetamine) in violation 
of U.C.A., section 58-37-8(2)(a)(i). 
The vehicle in which Defendant was a passenger was stopped by a 
Utah Highway Patrol trooper for a routine speeding violation (77 in a 
65) on State Road 80, Echo Canyon, Summit County, Utah. (R 54, pg. 
26, 1. 14-16) 
The Trooper asked the driver of the vehicle for her driver's 
license and registration. (R 54, pg. 26, 1. 17 to pg. 27, 1. 3) While 
the passenger (Defendant) was looking through the glove box for the 
vehicle owner's (Driver's) registration, the Trooper noticed a twelve 
pack of beer under the passenger's seat. The Trooper went around to 
the Passenger's side of the vehicle inspected the twelve pack of 
beer, found it to be unopened, however, observed a "cold cup" between 
the passenger's door and seat containing an open can of beer, 
one-eighth full. (R 54, pg. 28, 1. 23 to pg. 31, 1. 1) The Trooper 
asked the passenger (Defendant) for his I.D. and Defendant gave the 
Trooper his Wyoming driver's license. The Trooper issued a speeding 
citation to the driver of the vehicle and ran a warrant check on the 
passenger (Defendant). The warrant check revealed an outstanding 
traffic warrant on the passenger (Defendant) out of Coalville. The 
officer arrested the passenger (Defendant) on the outstanding warrant 
and transported the Defendant to the Summit County Jail. (R 54, pg. 
33, 1. 23 to pg. 34, 1. 23) The driver of the vehicle was free to 
go, however, she followed the Trooper to Coalville to await action on 
her boyfriend (Defendant). 
While booking the Defendant into the Summit County Jail the 
Trooper conducted a pat down search of the Defendant, felt something 
hard in the Defendant's shirt pocket, and found this object to be a 
small brown vial. The vial appeared to be empty, however, upon 
further inspection of the vial by the trooper he noticed what 
appeared to be minute white powder flakes on the upper edge of the 
vial. (R 54, pg. 38, 1. 11 to pg. 39, 1. 15 and pg. 40, 1. 3 to pg. 
42, 1. 7) Based upon his experience as a police officer, and without 
conducting any field tests, the Trooper felt that these white powdery 
flakes was contraband. (R 54, pg. 42, 1. 5-12) 
After the Defendant was booked into the Summit County Jail, the 
Trooper then went outside of the jail complex to the vehicle in which 
the Defendant was traveling. The Trooper approached the driver/owner 
of the vehicle, Vicky Courtney, told her that he found a vial on the 
Defendant, believed it contained cocaine, and was going to search Ms. 
Courtney. The Trooper then conducted a full blown search of Ms. 
Courtney and her purse outside of her vehicle in the Courthouse 
parking lot. The Trooper found nothing. The Trooper then proceeded to 
conduct a full blown search of Ms. Courtney's vehicle without asking 
for her permission. The Trooper found nothing. (R 54, pg. 43, 1. 3 to 
pg. 48, 1. 12) After the search of the vehicle the Trooper then began 
searching the pockets of a jacket in Ms. Courtney's vehicle and found 
a small yellow scraper with a folded piece of paper tucked into the 
protective shield. The Trooper asked whose jacket it was and Ms. 
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Courtney identified the jacket as belonging to the Defendant, (R 54, 
pg. 48, 1. 13 to pg. 52, 1. 1) The Trooper took the yellow scraper up 
to the jail along with the coat it was found in and asked the 
Defendant if it was his jacket. The Defendant identified the jacket 
as his but when confronted with the yellow scraper denied having 
knowledge as to where the scraper came from. The Trooper then opened 
the paper bindle in front of the Defendant and found it to contain a 
small quantity of a white powdery substance. Upon his belief that the 
owdery substance contained contraband the Defendant was charged with 
P:_ .vission of a Controlled Substance. (R 54, pg. 52, 1. 2 to pg. 54, 
1 . 6) 
The Defendant was bound over for trial at the conclusion of his 
Preliminary Hearing. The Defendant made a Motion to Suppress the 
Evidence and on March 20, 1989, before Judge J. Dennis Frederick, a 
combined suppression hearing and bench trial was conducted. (R 54, 
pg. 4, 1. 15 to pg. 5, 1. 19) At the conclusion of the hearing/trial 
the Motion to Suppress was denied and Defendant was found guilty. (R 
54, pg. 103, 1. 18 to pg. 108, 1. 12 and pg. 124, 1. 17 to pg. 125, 
1. 11) It is from the Court's denial of the Motion to Suppress and 
Guilty Verdict that Defendant now appeals. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Were the law enforcement officer's warrantless, post arrest 
search of the vehicle a constitutionally valid search under the 
provisions of the Federal and State Constitutions. 
2. Was the amount of controlled substance found on State's 
Exhibit No. 2 an insufficient amount to substantiate a conviction 
for "Possession of a Controlled Substance". 
/. _ 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
THE LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER'S WARRANTLESS, POST ARREST SEARCH OF THE 
VEHICLE, AND ITS CONTENTS, WAS NOT A CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID SEARCH 
Appellant primarily relies on the Utah case of STATE v. 
CHRISTENSEN, 676 P2d 408 (Utah, 1984) wherein, at page 411, the Court 
stated: 
"The validity of the arrest in this case does not determine 
whether the evidence was lawfully obtained. Rather, the issue is the 
constitutionality of the manner by which the evidence was obtained, 
irrespective of the legality of the arrest." 
Appellant submits that the CHRISTENSEN case frames the primary 
issue in this present appeal, to wit: The constitutionality of the 
manner by which the evidence was obtained. 
The Highway Patrol Trooper in this case conducted several 
warrantless searches after Appellant's arrest: a full blown search of 
the driver's purse as we?ll as a pat down search of the driver; a full 
blown search of the vehicle in which the Appellant was traveling, 
and; a full blown search of a jacket in the vehicle which belonged to 
the Appellant. (R 54, pg. 43, 1. 3 to pg. 52, 1. 1 ) . Thus we must 
look at these searches in light of the general guidelines set down in 
the CHRISTENSEN case. 
The Court in the CHRISTENSEN case affirmed the position that 
"Warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable unless 
exigent circumstances require action before a warrant can be 
obtained." (at pg. 411, further citing ROBBINS v. CALIFORNIA, 453 
U.S. 420, 101 S.Ct. 2841, 69 L.Ed.2d 744 [1981], KATZ v. UNITED 
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STATES, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 [1967], STATE v. 
ROMERO, 660 P2d 715 [Utah, 1983], STATE v. LEE, 633 P2d 48 [Utah, 
1983]) 
Appellant contends that the only grounds upon which the searches 
could be held valid are if it is found that: 1) the searches were 
incident to a valid arrest, or; 2) exigent circumstances existed. 
Appellant asserts that the searches were not incident to a valid 
arrest. The facts in this case indicate that the Appellant, a 
passenger in the vehicle, was arrested on State Road 80, Echo Canyon, 
Summit County, Utah (R 54, pg. 26, 1. 14-16), after the Trooper 
stopped the driver of the vehicle, Appellant's girlfriend, ran a 
warrants check on the Appellant and found an outstanding warrant on 
the Appellant for a traffic violation. The Appellant was then taken 
in the Trooper's vehicle to Coalville and booked into jail. The 
driver of the vehicle was not detained at the scene of Appellant's 
arrest, nor was the vehicle impounded, however, the driver of the 
vehicle chose to follow the Trooper to Coalville to await the outcome 
of her boyfriend, Appellant. (R 54, pg. 33, 1. 23 to pg. 34, 1. 23). 
It was not until after the Appellant was booked into the jail, 
subjected to an inventory search and a "suspicious looking" vial 
found on Appellant's person by the Trooper that the Trooper decided 
to conduct his three searches. Under these facts, Appellant asserts 
that the searches could not have been incident to the Appellant's 
arrest as the Courts have generally held that a delayed search of a 
car cannot be upheld as incident to an arrest. (CHAMBERS V. MARONEY, 
399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 [1970]; PRESTON v. U.S., 
376 U.S. 364, 84 S.Ct. 881, 11 L.Ed.2d 777 [1964]) 
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Disposing of this issue, we must now glean the facts to 
determine if any exigent circumstances existed at the time of the 
searches. However, prior to determining whether exigent 
circumstances existed, sufficient to excuse the constitutional 
necessity of a search warrant, a threshold issue must be dealt with: 
did the Trooper have Probable Cause - probable cause upon which a 
search warrant could have been issued- This concept is generally 
known as the CARROLL-CHAMBERS DOCTRINE which incorporates the 
guidelines espoused in the cases of CARROLL v. U.S., 267 U.S. 132, 45 
S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 [1925] and CHAMBERS V. MAROINEY, 399 U.S. 42, 
90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 [1970]. 
When police may proceed to search the vehicle without first 
obtaining a warrant, it would appear that only the procedure of 
obtaining a search warrant is being excused; there must still be 
grounds upon which a search warrant could have been issued. As the 
court put it in CHAMBERS, it is still essential that there be 
"circumstances which furnish probable cause to search a particular 
auto for particular articles." 
As the facts in this case would indicate, the Trooper had no 
probable cause to believe that the vehicle, driver of the vehicle or 
the jacket in the vehicle contained contraband. In support of this 
assertion we must look at what facts the Trooper had before him upon 
which he could have formed a probable cause: 
i. All the Trooper found pursuant to the inventory search of 
the Appellant was a seemingly empty, small, dark brown vial with a 
minuscule amount of white crusting on the lip of the jar. (State's 
Exhibit No. 2 ) . (R 54, pg. 65, 1. 6 to pg. 68, 1. 7) The amount of 
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white substance found by the Trooper was so insignificant that the 
State's Toxicology expert initially did not test the substance and 
thought the brown vial was empty.(R 54, pg. 62, 1. 8-17 and pg. 65, 
1. 6 to pg. 68, 1. 7) 
2. At the scene of the initial traffic stop the Trooper had 
ample opportunity to visually examine the interior of the vehicle as 
well as the contents of the glovebox and had no probable cause to 
suspect that the vehicle contained contraband. (R 54, pg. 37, 1. 17 
to pg. 38, 1. 10) 
3. After the Trooper conducted two of the illegal searches, the 
search of the automobile and the search of the driver's purse, the 
Trooper still found no contraband nor any evidence of contraband. (R 
54, pg. 45, 1. 2 to pg. 48, 1. 12) 
4. Prior to the Trooper beginning his third illegal search, 
into the pockets of Appellant's jacket in the car, the jacket itself 
and its weight failed to raise any suspicion. (R 54, pg. 48, 1. 13-23 
and pg. 49, 1. 1-18) 
It was at this point in time that the Trooper went into the 
pockets of the jacket and found State's Exhibit No. 3 (the scraper 
with the paper bindle tucked behind it). Up to this point in time 
the Trooper had absolutely no probable cause to believe that the 
vehicle, its contents, and/or its occupants had any contraband. It is 
Appellant's contention that the searches conducted by the Trooper was 
merely unconstitutional searches amounting to nothing more than a 
fishing expedition which lead to the unconstitutional seizure of what 
was later introduced into evidence against the Appellant as State's 
Exhibit No. 3 (the scraper with the paper bindle tucked behind it). 
For arguments sake, if the Trooper was deemed to have had 
sufficient probable causae, we must now determine whether or not there 
were sufficient exigent circumstances present to excuse the 
constitutional requirement and procedure of obtaining a search 
warrant. 
It is the Appellant's contention that the Trooper had ample time 
to obtain a search warrant for the vehicle if he had probable cause 
to believe that the vehicle, its contents and/or the driver were 
concealing contraband. In reaching this conclusion, Appellant points 
to the following facts: 
1. The vehicle was voluntarily driven to the Summit County Jail 
by the Appellant's girlfriend who was patiently waiting for the 
Appellant to go through the booking process. 
2. The Summit County Jail is located in the Summit County 
Courthouse, in Coalville, Utah and shares the same premises with the 
Courts and a Highway Patrol Headquarters. 
3. The Trooper could have, prior to conducting the searches, 
impounded or detained the vehicle and readily obtained a search 
warrant from the Coalville Justice of the Peace. As the Court in the 
CARROLL case stated, in "cases where the securing of a warrant is 
reasonable practicable, it must be used." 
4. The vehicle was parked, immobile, and unoccupied thus not 
giving rise to exigent circumstances- (STATE v. KOCK, 725 P2d 1285 
[Ore., 1985]). 
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POINT II 
THE AMOUNT OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE FOUND ON STATE'S EXHIBIT NO. 2 IS 
INSUFFICIENT TO SUBSTANTIATE A CONVICTION FOR "POSSESSION OF A 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE" 
From the facts of this case it is undisputed that all the 
Trooper found pursuant to the inventory search of the Appellant was a 
seemingly empty, small, dark brown vial with a minuscule amount of 
white crusting on the lip of the jar. (State's Exhibit No. 2 ) . (R 54, 
pg. 65, 1. 6 to pg. 68, 1. 7) The amount of white substance found by 
the Trooper was so insignificant that the State s Toxicology expert 
initially did not test the substance and thought the brown vial was 
empty.(R 54, pg. 62, 1. 8-17 and pg. 65, 1. 6 to pg. 68, 1. 7) 
Further, the State s Toxicology expert testified that the quantity of 
methamphetamine found on the brown vial amounted to residue - an 
insufficient amount to cause any physical effect on an individual. (R 
54, pg. 67, 1. 6 to pg. 68, 1. 7 and pg. 69, 1. 15-18) 
U.C.A., section 58-37-2(27), which defines the term "Possession" 
makes no reference to quantity. Likewise, the statute under which 
Appellant was charged, U.C.A., section 58-37-8(2)(a)(l), makes no 
reference to quantity. In light of the absence of any statutory 
reference to quantity and the minuscule amount of methamphetamine 
found on the brown vial (State's Exhibit No. 2) amounting to nothing 
more than residue - an insufficient amount to cause any physical 
effect on an individual, State s Exhibit No. 2 and the 
methamphetamine found thereon are insufficient to uphold Appellant s 
conviction under U.C.A., section 58-37-8(2)(a)(i). (PEOPLE v. LEAL, 
413 P2d 665 [Cal., 1966]; PEOPLE v. JOHNSON, 85 Cal. Rptr. 238 [Cal., 
1970]; BEUTLER v. STATE, 504 P2d 699 [Nev., 1972] 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant urges the Court to determine that: 1) As to State's 
Exhibit No. 1, the amount of methamphetamme found thereon, amounting 
to useless traces, does not constitute a criminal act within the 
meaning of U.C.A., section 58-37-2(27) and U.C.A., section 
58-37-8(2)(a)(l), and; ?) That the post arrest warrantless searches 
of the vehicle and its contents and occupants constitute 
constitutionally illegal searches and seizures requiring suppress of 
State s Exhibit No. 3. 
For the foregoing arguments, Defendant/Appellant requests that 
this Court: 
1. Reverse his conviction by the trial court; 
2. For such further relief as the Court deems appropriate under 
the circumstances. 
Dated this 21st day of July, 1989. 
X^ 
Attorney 
pellant 
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ADDENDUM 
- 1 2 -
58-37-2 OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS 68 
(c) articles, other than food, intended to 
affect the structure or function of man or 
other animals; and 
(d) articles intended for use as a compo-
nent of any articles specified in Subsection 
(a), (b), or (c); but does not include devices or 
their components, parts, or accessories. 
(14) "Drug dependent person" means any indi-
vidual who unlawfully and habitually uses any 
controlled substance to endanger the public 
morals, health, safety, or welfare, or who is so 
dependent upon the use of controlled substances 
as to have lost the power of self-control with ref-
erence to his dependency. 
(15) "Food" means: 
(a) any nutrient or substance of plant, 
mineral, or animal origin other than a drug 
as specified in this chapter, and normally in-
gested by human beings; and 
(b) foods for special dietary uses as exist 
by reason of a physical, physiological, patho-
logical, or other condition including but not 
limited to the conditions of disease, convales-
cence, pregnancy, lactation, allergy, hyper-
sensitivity to food, underweight, and over-
weight; uses for supplying a particular di-
etary feeed which exist by reason of age in-
cluding but not limited to the ages of infancy 
and childbirth, and also uses for supplement-
ing and for fortifying the ordinary or un-
usual diet with any vitamin, mineral, or 
other dietary property for use of a food. Any 
particular use of a food is a special dietary 
use regardless of the nutritional purposes. 
(16) "Immediate precursor" means a substance 
which the Attorney General of the United States 
has found to be, and by regulation designated as 
being, the principal compound used or produced 
primarily for use in the manufacture of a con-
trolled substance, or which is an immediate 
chemical intermediary used or likely to be used 
in the manufacture of a controlled substance, the 
control of which is necessary to prevent, cur>iffl, 
or limit the manufacture of the controJJ^ tf sub-
stance. 
(17) "Manufacture" means the production, 
preparation, propagation, compounding, or pro-
cessing of a controlled substaifev either directly 
or indirectly by extraction from substances of 
natural origin, or independently by means of 
chemical synthesis or by a combination of extrac-
tion and chemical synthesis. 
(18) "Manufacturer" includes any person who 
packages, repackages, or labels any container of 
any controlled substance, except pharmacists 
who dispense or compound prescription orders for 
delivery to the ultimate consumer. 
(19) "Marihuana" means all parts of the plant 
cannabis sativa L. whether growing or not; the 
seeds of it; the resin extracted from any part of 
the plant; and every compound, manufacture, 
salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of the 
plant, its seeds, or resin. The term does not in-
clude the mature stalks of the plant, fiber pro-
duced from the stalks, oil or cake made from the 
seeds of the plant, any other compound, manufac-
ture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of 
the mature stalks, except the resin extracted 
from them, fiber, oil or cake, or the sterilized seed 
of the plant which is incapable of germination. 
Any synthetic equivalents of the substances con-
tained in the plant cannabis sativa which are 
chemically indistinguishable and pharmacologi-
cally active are also included. 
(20) "Money" means officially issued coin and 
currency of the United States or any foreign 
country. 
(21) "Narcotic drug" means any of the follow-
ing, whether produced directly or indirectly by 
extraction from substances of vegetable origin, or 
independently by means of chemical synthesis, or 
by a combination of extraction and chemical syn-
thesis: 
(a) opium, coca leaves, and opiates; 
(b) a compound, manufacture, salt, deriva-
tive, or preparation of opium, coca leaves, or 
opiates; 
(c) opium poppy and poppy straw; or 
(d) a substance, and any compound, manu-
facture, salt, derivative, or preparation of 
the substance, which is chemically identical 
with any of the substances referred to in 
Subsections (a), (b), or (c), except narcotic 
drug does not include decocainized coca 
leaves or extracts of coca leaves which do not 
contain cocaine or ecgonine. 
(22) "Negotiable instrument" means docu-
ments, containing an unconditional promise to 
pay a sum of money, which are legally transfer-
able to another party by endorsement or delivery. 
(23) "Opiate" means any drug or other sub-
stance having an addiction-forming or addiction-
sustaining liability similar to morphine or being 
capable of conversion into a drug having addic-
tion-forming or addiction-sustaining liability. 
(24) "Opium poppy" means the plant of the 
species papaver somniferum L., except the seeds 
of the plant. 
(25) "Person" means any corporation, associa-
tion, partnership, trust, other institution or en-
tity or one or more individuals. 
(26) "Poppy straw" means all parts, except the 
seeds, of the opium poppy, after mowing. 
(27) "Possession" or "use" means the joint or 
individual ownership, control, occupancy, hold-
ing, retaining, belonging, maintaining, obtain-
ing, or the application, inhalation, swallowing, 
injection, or consumption, as distinguished from 
distribution, of controlled substances and in-
cludes individual, joint, or group possession or 
use of controlled substances. For a person to be a 
possessor or user of a controlled substance, it is 
not required that he be shown to have individu-
ally possessed, used, or controlled the substance, 
but it is sufficient if it is shown that he jointly 
participated with one or more persons in the use, 
possession, or control of any substances with 
knowledge that the activity was occurring. 
(28) "Practitioner" means a physician, dentist, 
veterinarian, pharmacist, scientific investigator, 
pharmacy, hospital, or other person licensed, reg-
istered, or otherwise permitted to distribute, dis-
pense, conduct research with respect to, adminis-
ter, or use in teaching or chemical analysis a con-
trolled substance in the course of professional 
practice or research in this state. 
(29) "Proceeds" means whatever is received 
when an object is sold, exchanged, or otherwise 
disposed of. 
(30) "Production" means the manufacture, 
planting, cultivation, growing, or harvesting of a 
controlled substance. 
(31) "Securities" means any stocks, bonds, 
notes, or other evidences of debt or of property. 
OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS 68-37-8 
(m) filled and dispensed by a pharmacist 
practicing his profession within the physical 
structure of the hospital, or the order is 
taken from a supply lawfully maintained by 
the hospital and the amount taken from the 
supply is administered directly to the patient 
authorized to receive it 
(8) No information communicated to any licensed 
actitioner in an attempt to unlawfully procure or 
procure the administration of, a controlled sub 
ance is considered to be a privileged communica 
>n 1967 
(-37-7. Labeling and packaging controlled 
substance. 
(1) No person licensed pursuant to this act shall 
stribute a controlled substance unless it is pack-
fed and labeled in compliance with the require-
ente of § 305 of the Federal Comprehensive Drug 
buse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 
(2) No person except a pharmacist for the purpose 
filling a prescription shall alter, deface, or remove 
ly label affixed by the manufacturer 
(3) Whenever a pharmacist sells or dispenses any 
mtrolled substance on a prescription issued by a 
ractitioner, he shall affix to the container in which 
le substantia is sold or dispensed a label showing his 
wn name, address, and registry number, or the 
ame, address, and registry number of the pharma 
tst or pharmacy owner for whom he is lawfully act-
ig, the prescription number, the name of the patient, 
r if the patient is an animal, the name of the owner 
f the animal and the species of the animal, the name 
f the practitioner by whom the prescription was 
mtten, any directions stated on the prescription and 
ny directions required by rules and regulations pro-
lulgated by the department 
No person shall alter the face or remove any label 
o long as any of the original^ contents remain 
(4) An individual to whom or for whose use any 
on trolled substance has been prescribed, sold, or dis-
pensed by a practitioner and the owner of any animal 
or which any substance has been prescnbed^ssfa, or 
iispensed by a vetennanan may lawfullv^i^Vssess it 
nly in the container in which it was delivered to him 
>y the person selling or dispensing it 1966 
•8-37-8. Prohibited acts — p e n a l t i e s . 
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is 
unlawful for any person to knowingly and inten-
tionally 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or 
to possess with intent to produce, manufac-
ture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit 
substance, 
(n) distnbute a controlled or counterfeit 
substance, or to agree, consent, offer, or ar-
range to distribute a controlled or counter-
feit substance, 
(in) possess a controlled substance in the 
course of his business as a sales representa-
tive of a manufacturer or distributor of sub-
stances listed in Schedules II through V ex-
cept under an order or prescription, 
dv) possess a controlled or counterfeit sub-
stance with intent to distnbute 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsec 
tion (1) (a) with respect to 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or 
II is euiltv of a second degree felony and 
Subsection (lKa) is guilty of a first degree 
felony, 
(n) a substance classified in Schedule HI 
or IV, or manhuana, is guilty of a third de 
gree felony, and upon a second or subsequent 
conviction punishable under this subsection 
is guilty of a second degree felony, or 
(m) a substance classified in Schedule V is 
guilty of a class A misdemeanor and upon a 
second or subsequent conviction punishable 
under this subsection is guilty of a third de-
gree felony 
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties 
(a) It is unlawful 
(i) for any person knowingly and inten-
tionally to possess or use a controlled sub-
stance, unless it was obtained under a valid 
prescnption or order or directly from a prac 
titioner while acting in the course of his pro-
fessional practice, or as otherwise authonzed 
by this subsection, 
(n) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or per-
son in control of any building, room, tene 
ment, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place, 
knowingly and intentionally to permit them 
to be occupied by persons unlawfully possess 
ing, using, or distnbutmg controlled sub 
stances in any of those locations, 
(m) for any person knowingly and inten-
tionally to be present where controlled sub-
stances are being used or possessed in viola-
tion of this chapter and the use or possession 
is open, obvious, apparent, and not concealed 
from those present, however, a person may 
not be convicted under this subsection if the 
evidence shows that he did not use the sub-
stance himself or advise, encourage, or assist 
anyone else to do so, any incidence of prior 
unlawful use of controlled substances by the 
defendant may be admitted to rebut this de-
fense, 
(iv) for any person knowingly and inten-
tionally to possess an altered or forged pre-
scription or wntten order for a controlled 
substance, 
(v) for a practitioner licensed under this 
chapter knowingly and intentionally to pre-
scnbe, administer, or dispense a controlled 
substance to a juvenile, without first obtain-
ing the consent required in Section 78-14-5 
of a parent, guardian, or person standing in 
loco parentis of the juvenile except in cases 
of an emergency, for purposes of this subsec-
tion, a juvenile means a "child" as defined in 
Subsection 78-3a-2(3), and "emergency" 
means any physical condition requmng the 
administration of a controlled substance for 
immediate relief of pain or suffenng, 
(vi) for a practitioner licensed under this 
chapter knowingly and intentionally to pre-
8cnbe or administer dosages of a controlled 
substance in excess of medically recognized 
quantities necessary to treat the ailment, 
malady, or condition of the ultimate user, or 
(vn) for any person to prescnbe, adminis-
ter, or dispense any controlled substance to 
another person knowing that the other per-
son is using a false name, address, or other 
personal information for the purpose of se-
cunng the same 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsec 
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